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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

CHRIS DRAKOS and CHRIS
DRAKOS ENTERPRISES,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

)

)
)
)
)

vs.

)
)
)

GARRETT H. SANDOW AND
DOREA ENTERPRISES, INC.,

)
)
)
)

Docket Number: 47363-2019
Case No. CV6-2018-1345

Defendants/Respondents. )

_________

)

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District for Bingham County
Honorable Stevan H. Thompson, District Judge, Presiding
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. #2903
DUNN LAW OFFICE, PLLC
P.O. Box277
Rigby, Idaho 83442
(208) 745-9202
-rd-un-n(tv,du-n-n-lawoffices.-com

Garrett Sandow, Esq. #5215
220 N. Meridian
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
(208) 785-9300

APPELLANTS

RESPONDENTS

gs-a-ndowlaw@ao-1-.-com
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ARGUMENT
THE COURT'S RULING(S)
The court erred in the interpretation of the promissory note that was the evidence of
the money loaned to the respondent.
The respondent argues that the statute of limitation applies and bars the claim for
recovery upon the promissory note since the final payment was not made within five (5)
years. No question exists that the five (5) years had expired. The appellant, via the court's
decision, hangs its belief on time as stated in LC. §5-216. Yet it is very clear the note, in
written form, extended the time period by automatic renewal.
The promissory note 1 states, in part, as follows:
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers of this Note jointly and severally
waive any presentment for payment, notice of protest, and notice of non-payment, and
consent that this Note or any payment due under this Note may be extended or renewed
without prior demand or notice, and further consent to the release of any collateral or part
thereof, with or without substitution. (Emphasis supplied).
As stated in prior briefing, "waive" and "consent" are key words. Blacks Law
Dictionary defines waive as "to abandon, throw away, renounce, repudiate, or surrender a
claim ...to give up right or claim voluntarily." Likewise, consent is defined as "voluntarily
yielding the will to the proposition of another; acquiescence or compliance therewith...
Consent is an act of reason, accompanied with deliberation."

1 Record,

pp. 12-12, Exhibit A.
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The appellant never rebuts the clear and plain meaning of the language of the
promissory note. It is clear that Idaho law supports the plain and unambiguous language
in a document or in a statute. See, D&M Country Estates Homeowners Association v.

Romriell, 138 Idaho 160, 59 P.3d 965 (Idaho 2002). This court has stated that it should
"give words plain, usual and ordinary meaning". State v. Osborn, 165 Idaho 627, 449 P .3d
419 (Idaho 2019). "The intent of parties is determined from plain meaning of the words".

Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc. v Clear Springs Food, Jnc.,141 Idaho 117, 120, 106 P.3d 443,446
(2005) and "cannot conflict with clear terms of agreement".
Appellant insists there is no case law to support the language of the promissory note
but ignores the long-established rules in Idaho of giving the words of a document or statute
the plain and unambiguous language stated therein.
The language of the promissory note is clear and unambiguous and not capable of
multiple meanings.

A debt may be renewed by partial payment.
Subsequent to the district court's ruling on summary judgment, the appellants filed
a Motion to Reconsider.2 The motion was to indicate that the respondent, Garrett Sandow
performed legal services for the appellant with credit being given on the Note which would
renew the debt in addition to the language of the Note itself. This proposition was set forth
in the initial brief of appellants.
The appellant admit he performed services for Drakos in collection. The affidavits
of the parties are very clear on this point and not disputed by appellant. The lower court
tries to then make inferences from the work performed. The services were not rebutted

2

Record, pp. 60-61
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and it is not the province of the lower court, in a summary judgment proceeding, to make
inferences when the fact-finder is the jury.
The legal services were remuneration and clearly set forth in the affidavit of Chris
Drakos.3 Drakos indicated that the collection of a delinquent debt, unrelated to the case at
bar, that were performed via the services of Sandow were applied to the Note. As stated by
the district court in its earlier ruling on summary judgment, "but any payment of principal
or interest is equivalent to a new promise in writing, duly signed, to pay the residue of the
debt." (I.C. §5-238)4.

It is correct that no direct monetary payments were placed in the possession of
Appellant, Drakos, but rather credit was given.i Appellant's argument that Drakos did not
say money was received are misplaced. Services of value were received which is a form of
remuneration. (See, Appellants' argument in its briefing at page 9 last paragraph.)
The district court is correct that an amount was not stated in the affidavit of
Drakos. The amount is irrelevant. However, the district court cannot suggest that
remuneration did not occur. Sandow tries to minimize the legal services rendered to
Drakos but never refutes the affidavit of Drakos. Quite simply and in addition to the
language of the promissory note, the remuneration to the Appellant renewed the debt. The
lower court attempts to make inferences on the type and amount of remuneration when
that task is for the fact-finder, to-wit: the jury. It is alleged that the analysis of the lower
court is misplaced.

3 Record, pp. 62-65.
4 Record, p. 6, Decision and Order.
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CONCLUSION
The relief requested is to reverse the decision of the district court on summary
judgment and grant summary judgment to the appellants. A remand is necessary to
determine fees and costs at the district court level.
The reversal should be based upon the clear language of the promissory note and
the support law in Idaho to give words their clear meaning when the same are not
ambiguous.
Remuneration on a debt, in any form, renews the debt.

Dated this 13 th day of January, 2020.

_aO::::s)_

Isl Robin D. Dunn
Robin D. Dunn
Attorney for Appellants
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